




The philosophical term “moral relativism” has long since crept out of 
the academy and found its place in the lexicon of public political debate. A 
term denoting the absence of any absolute standard for judging between 
what ought to be and what ought not to be has been adopted by many 
right-wing commentators to critically characterize the left. Social 
conservatives pin the blame for the loss of values in today’s society on the 
influence of “left-liberal” tolerance and multiculturalism. Certain strands 
of the left respond by accusing the right of “cultural imperialism”, of 
falsely universalizing Western values and wishing to impose them on other 
peoples. These mutual accusations play a large part in current portrayals of 
the left-right dichotomy. 
The aim here is to demonstrate that, contrary to these fashionable 
caricatures, moral relativism can be most suitably designated as 
definitively right-wing and moral universalism as definitively left-wing. 
The terms right-wing and left-wing originated in the seating arrangements 
of the French National Assembly in 1789, where those sitting on the left 
supported revolutionary change informed by the universalism of the 
Enlightenment and those sitting on the right supported the conservation of 
the traditional social order. It may superficially appear that the terms have 
since undergone a reversal of meaning, with elements of the left claiming 
to oppose Enlightenment universalism and elements of the right claiming 
to believe in the universality of Western values. However, a symptomatic 
analysis of these claims can reveal that the original left-right schema 
remains operative beneath a surface of rhetorical refractions and 
distortions. Social conservatives still regard their values as stemming from 
the traditions of particular countries, not from universal principles, and the 




purported multiculturalism of elements of the left is really an expression of 
certain values that are meant to transcend any particular culture. 
Multiculturalism is a universalism that is unaware that it is a universalism; 
a universalism in denial. 
Confusing the Normative and the Meta-Ethical 
The lexical imprecision and conceptual confusion surrounding moral 
relativism are partly the product of its emergence as something of a buzz-
word in the political punditry of the mass media. Public figures ranging 
from Fox News television presenters to the Pope himself have employed it 
as a term of abuse to be hurled in the direction of those who are perceived 
to be the purveyors of a licentious social liberalism. Newspaper columnists 
and populist politicians alike decry the relativism-fueled tolerance that 
takes the form of a refusal to morally condemn practices that conflict with 
traditional Western values. For example, Melanie Phillips, a columnist for 
the socially conservative Daily Mail newspaper, regularly rails against a 
moral relativism that she seems to equate with a general suspension of 
moral judgement. After the riots in British cities in August 2011, Britain’s 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the riots were 
caused by moral failings and thus that the appropriate response from the 
government should not be one that involved moral neutrality. He said, 
“this moral neutrality, this relativism – it’s not going to cut it anymore”. It 
is clear that many right-wingers regard the term ‘moral relativism’ as 
being synonymous with moral neutrality. 
The mistake here is to regard moral relativism as itself a moral 
position. The term is being used by media commentators and politicians to 
refer to the view that as traditional norms have no absolute or objective 
basis we should not condemn deviations from them. The use of the word 
“should” here indicates that a moral or normative position, that of a 
tolerant non-condemnation, is being derived from the belief that morality 
lacks an absolute basis. Those labeled “moral relativists” are supposedly 
espousing a “normative moral relativism”, the belief that we should 
tolerate values different to our own, which is based on a “meta-ethical 
moral relativism”, the belief that the only justificatory basis of morality 
lies within particular cultural traditions, not in absolute or universal 
principles that lie beyond them. However, “normative moral relativism” is 
a misnomer and an incoherent concept. A universal principle of tolerance 
cannot be derived from a belief in the absence of universal principles. 
Moral relativism is essentially a meta-ethical concept, a theoretical 
response to the question of how morals can be justified. It is the belief that 
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there is no absolute or universal basis for moral values or norms; they are 
merely derived from and relative to the particular traditions and cultures in 
which they are found. It could be countered that there is such a thing as a 
“descriptive moral relativism” that is not meta-ethical. This is the belief 
that, as a matter of empirical fact, there are no moral values or norms that 
are shared by all societies and cultures. However, as soon as this belief is 
used to support or justify any morally relevant judgement or action it 
ceases to be merely descriptive and becomes a meta-ethical position. The 
only coherent form of moral relativism that is relevant to any political or 
moral discussion about what ought to be done is the meta-ethical one. 
Conservatism 
There is nothing in meta-ethical moral relativism to suggest that moral 
judgements should be suspended. Moral judgements can still be made on 
the understanding that their content is entirely the product of tradition and 
is not justifiable with reference to universal criteria that go beyond all 
traditions. The idea that morality has its basis in traditional norms and 
values sounds strangely similar to the doctrines held by social 
conservatives. Indeed, it would be reasonable to maintain that moral 
relativism constitutes the very meta-ethical foundation of conservatism 
itself. It is telling that conservative commentators often explicitly base 
their own positions on geographically relative terms, like “British values” 
or “Western values”, even when accusing others of moral relativism. The 
contents of any particular form of conservatism are entirely relative to the 
historical situation at hand. Conservatives rarely want to go back to what 
conservatives in earlier periods of history campaigned to retain, such as 
racial segregation or not allowing women to vote. The contents of 
conservatism are thus historically and culturally relative. 
Social conservatives tend to support their moral beliefs with reference 
to either tradition or nature. What these two seemingly disparate notions 
have in common is that they both refer to the given, to the facts at hand. If 
morality rests on the given, on whatever merely happens to be the case, 
then its basis requires no justification or legitimation. The eighteenth-
century philosopher David Hume recognized the dangers of such a 
position when he claimed that it is a mistake to derive an “ought” from an 
“is”, to equate what should be the case with what actually is the case 
(Hume, 1978: 469). Ironically, Hume himself not only failed to develop 
this insight further, he actually betrayed it by developing a theory of 
morality based entirely on the sentiments that he regarded as naturally 




knowledge or morality, the former being an illusory manifestation of what 
in reality are nothing other than habitual and customary ways of thinking, 
the latter being merely a description of some of the emotions that nature 
has given us. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Hume’s sceptical anti-
rationalism, his belief that it is impossible to transcend social conventions 
and reflexive emotional reactions, went hand in hand with a political 
conservatism that did not wish to disturb the given social fabric. 
An emphasis on the importance of adherence to tradition for the 
maintenance of a healthy social fabric is explicitly pitched against the 
universalist ideals of the French Revolution in the writings of Hume’s 
near-contemporary Edmund Burke. It is for this reason that Burke is often 
considered to be the founder of social conservatism. In his book 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke argues that attachment to 
the bonds of national tradition rather than abstract universal rights 
conforms to human nature and secures social harmony. He claims that “the 
rights of Englishmen… as a patrimony derived from their forefathers” 
provides a more secure moral and social foundation than the “abstract 
principles” of “the rights of men” (Burke, 1987: 28). For Burke, it is 
simply “natural” to venerate those who are higher in the established social 
order. He even advocates “prejudice”, describing it as “the general bank 
and capital of nations” which can enable people to be virtuous without 
thinking (Burke, 1987: 76). The rejection of universality and the defense 
of national and traditional prejudice demonstrate that Burkean social 
conservatism rests on a moral relativist meta-ethical basis. 
Exclusivism 
The emphasis on the value of prejudice stemming from particular 
national traditions unites social conservatism with certain forms of 
nationalism. The nationalism that is of concern here is not the idea that one 
nation should be opposed to being ruled by another, an idea grounded in 
the universal principle of the right of nations to self-determination. It is the 
belief that the nation or the fatherland is of paramount value and that it 
should assert itself against internal and external threats to its identity. 
Universality is the abstract form of the threat to this sense of identity from 
cosmopolitan contaminations. The most well-known cases of such ultra-
nationalism are the fascism and Nazism of the early twentieth century. 
Here there is no pretense of the legal justification of power with reference 
to any external or transcendent principle; there is just the willful self-
assertion of the nation, the state, and its leader. Mussolini himself 
recognized that fascism has a relativist basis when he said: “If relativism 
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signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the 
bearers of an objective immortal truth, then there is nothing more 
relativistic than fascism” (Mussolini, cited in Cook, 1999: 17). This is a 
normative derivation from meta-ethical relativism that is somewhat 
different to the notion of multicultural tolerance. Mussolini thought of 
himself as putting into practice the relativist philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. What Nietzsche calls “perspectivism”, the denial of all absolute 
truths, leads to his view that values are relative to and the expression of a 
particular will to power, the demand for their universal justification and 
validity being merely a decadent self-destructive stifling of this will. 
The relativist idea that there are no rational grounds to justify any 
political ideology lies behind forms of conservatism and nationalism that 
regard values and rights as applying to particular groups and not to 
everyone. This intrinsic particularism means that such political positions 
are limited in their global reach. While pragmatic trans-national alliances 
between those who share conservative or nationalist ideologies often 
occur, they are ultimately restricted as there is nothing in the ideology that 
allows for a reconciliation of all humanity. Conservatives in Texas and 
conservatives in Saudi Arabia are not going to see eye to eye. Russian 
nationalists hate Poles; Polish nationalists hate Russians. After all, there 
can be no international brotherhood of xenophobes. 
The idea that adopting a political position and identifying oneself with 
a particular national ideal cannot coherently involve an aspiration towards 
the reconciliation of all humanity, that it always presupposes an excluded 
antithetical enemy, was explicitly put forward in the 1920s by the German 
political philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt. For him, true politics 
involves making a decision and taking a position against an enemy, a pure 
decision that is not grounded in any rational universal principle which 
would potentially enable an ultimate reconciliation with all enemies. A 
national community is constituted through the exclusion of its non-
members. The purpose of the state is to defend the purity of this identity 
from the threat of contamination by otherness, not to embody and enforce 
the rights of all. Echoing Burke’s “rights of Englishmen”, Schmitt wrote in 
a pamphlet: “All right is the right of a particular Volk” (Schmitt, cited in 
Posner, 2002: 89). Schmitt believed that his moral relativist political 
theory was realized in the ideology and political practice of the Nazis, with 
their groundless extra-legal executive decisions and their anti-universalist 
assertion of a particular group against those designated to be definitively 
enemies.  
The idea of the maintenance of the cohesion of a community and its 




groups of people seamlessly unites Schmitt’s conservatism with his 
embrace of ultra-nationalism. It may seem strange then that a thinker who 
was largely forgotten for many decades has undergone a remarkable 
revival of interest over the last twenty years amongst academic left-
wingers, such as Chantal Mouffe (2005: 117-134). There are two identifiable 
reasons for this. One is Schmitt’s emphasis on the inescapability and 
irreducibility of the political, the political as that which cannot be 
universalized, which always involves setting up an adversary, which 
demands the taking of a position as opposed to a neutral apolitical 
disengagement, and which contrasts with more typically conservative 
pseudo-apolitical references to nature and common sense. The other 
reason is the influence of certain forms of epistemological and historical 
relativism, under the banner of postmodernism, which have involved an 
understanding of twentieth century totalitarianism as being the culmination 
of the rationalist totalizing universalism of the Enlightenment, an 
understanding which enables Schmitt’s anti-rationalist relativism to be 
seen as anti-totalitarian despite his own personal commitments. 
This account of the intellectual origins of totalitarianism is flawed, 
because it relies on the assumption that there is a real connection between 
ambitious “totalizing” theories which aim to amplify their explanatory 
reach and a totalitarian political stance. In fact, the relationship between 
totalization in thought and totalitarianism in politics is not one of logical 
entailment, but is merely a devious lexical slippage. The rational 
universalism of the Enlightenment was not appreciated by the advocates of 
fascism and, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, “the philosophy that legitimizes 
a totalitarian regime is generally some kind of evolutionary or vitalist 
relativism” (Žižek, 1996: 5). A universal totality is a very different kind of 
thing to the restricted totality of a closed identity. As Hegel’s philosophy 
could be seen as the ultimate example of a universalistic rational 
totalization, it is perhaps instructive that Schmitt celebrated Hitler’s 
accession to power as the day that “Hegel died” (Schmitt, 2002: 35). 
Returning to the first reason for Schmitt’s resurrection by the academic 
left, his notion of the irreducibility of the political accords with the left-
wing urge to politicize what conservative ideology usually masks or 
naturalizes. Indeed, similarities can be discerned between Schmitt’s 
conception of the political and that of Lenin. Lenin also held that taking a 
partisan position is unavoidable and that there is no transcendent 
impartiality through which disputes could be arbitrated, the difference here 
being that the relevant enemy is not a national or ethnic adversary, but a 
class one. The Soviet Union’s obsession with “enemies of the people” 
gave it a thoroughly Schmittian aspect. What appears to be Lenin’s moral 
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relativism stems from an interpretation of Marx in which morality is 
nothing more than a refracted manifestation in the ideological 
superstructure of certain aspects of the socio-economic infrastructure, of 
the social relations of production. According to this interpretation, 
morality is socially relative, relative to particular class interests, and 
historically relative, relative to the mode of production in place at a 
particular time. However, unlike the neo-Schmittian academic left of today 
who believe in the irreducibility of political antagonism, Marxism of any 
interpretation involves the belief in the eventual reconciliation of all 
humanity in a just society. The proletariat is the “universal class” whose 
victory will lead to the eventual abolition of all class distinctions. This is 
an eschatological chink in the relativist edifice that is absent from right-
wing ideologies. 
Transcendent Arbitrariness: the Religious Right 
Redemptive eschatology and universalism are features of Christianity, 
yet more often than not religion is associated with the right of the political 
spectrum. This may be due to religions usually being embroiled in the 
traditions of particular cultures, but the major religions seem to make 
universal moral claims. The Catholic Church is, of course, the “universal 
church”. However, this does not significantly trouble the argument that 
right-wing ideologies are morally relativistic. Religion is by no means 
inherently right-wing. From radical protestant reformers like Thomas 
Müntzer to Latin American liberation theologians, Christians have often 
been on the side of revolutionaries struggling for equality. 
It is religious fundamentalism that is both right-wing and morally 
relativistic. This is because fundamentalists believe that something is right 
because it is written in a holy book, not that something is written in the 
holy book because it is right. This dichotomy is a version of the dilemma 
formulated by Socrates in Plato’s “Euthyphro” dialogue: “Is the pious 
loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by 
the gods?” (Plato, 1997: 9). The fundamentalist position here is a case of 
moral relativism, because the view that God’s will is in no need of further 
justification effectively means that what is right is relative to the willful 
whim of a particular being and that there are no more grounds for 
following this than there would be for following the whim of any other 
particular being, except for the mere fact that the particular being in 
question is very powerful. Fundamentalism can be defined as a normative 
moral absolutism resting on a meta-ethical moral relativism, which is to 




meta-ethical “for no other reason than that this powerful individual says 
so”. 
Of course, there are many whose religious beliefs do not fall on the 
moral relativist side of the Euthyphro dilemma, but who nevertheless 
adhere to some form of political conservatism. However, the conservatism 
is based on merely traditional values whereas their eschatological 
universalism is, unlike that of the Marxists, reserved for the after-life, a 
relativism of this world and an absolutism of the next world. A similar 
compartmentalization can be seen in the coexistence of an adherence to 
moral absolutes at the personal level and a cynical realism at the political 
level. Unlike the left, who often conflate morality and politics, such as 
with the feminist motto “the personal is political”, the right tends to 
rigorously separate them. The socio-political realism that ensues from this 
separation is encapsulated by Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible 
hand”, the idea that the best way to achieve the common good is to avoid, 
at the political level, putting into practice moral principles whose aim is to 
achieve the common good. 
This compartmentalization and separation of morality from politics is 
informed by the idea that any attempt to improve society by means of 
political control and intervention, however well-intended, inevitably leads 
to unintended undesirable consequences, whether they take the form of 
economic decline or political tyranny. The conservative political 
philosopher Eric Voegelin argues that political attempts to create an ideal 
society have evil consequences, because such attempts are manifestations 
of the epistemological and gnoseological arrogance and hubris of 
humanity. This arrogance is essentially the idea that human knowledge is 
ultimately capable of working out the means of creating heaven on earth, 
an idea that Voegelin refers to as “Gnosticism”. For Voegelin, modern 
ideologies that ultimately aim to achieve an earthly paradise are guilty of 
“immanentizing” eschatology, the moral dangers of which lie in its denial 
of transcendence, the denial of any authority above and beyond humanity 
(Voegelin, 1987: 163). The ultimate fulfillment of human spiritual aims 
lies exclusively in the transcendent heavenly realm and it is a grave 
mistake to try to bring about such fulfillment in the secular political world. 
This viewpoint echoes a certain line of thinking within the Christian 
tradition that advocates a rigorous separation between the spiritual and the 
secular worlds, a line that includes Augustine’s distinction between the 
heavenly city and the earthly city and Luther’s doctrine of the two 
kingdoms, an idea that ultimately stems from a particular interpretation of 
Jesus’s statement, “Render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and unto 
God what belongs to God” (Matthew 22:21). 
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Voegelin’s political conservatism is based on the recognition of the 
importance of avoiding the implementation of moral absolutes in political 
practice. This is because for him the ideal of how things ought to be is not 
amenable to human knowledge; any claims to such knowledge are false 
and are to be dismissed with the pejorative term “Gnosticism”. These 
claims are false and dangerous, because through them humans are 
presuming to accede to what is the rightful preserve of God. What this 
means is that moral absolutes should not inform human socio-political 
aspirations, because these absolutes are transcendent with regard to human 
knowledge. If they are transcendent in this manner then such absolutes can 
only appear in this world, in the realm of immanence, in the form of the 
arbitrary dictates of a God understood as mere authority. In this way 
Voegelin falls on the moral relativist side of the Euthyphro dilemma. 
The Libertarian Market 
The need to avoid the unintended consequences of political intervention 
is also a key characteristic of the more secular-minded proponents of 
laissez-faire economic liberalism, the so-called right-wing libertarians. 
Out of Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” of the free market through 
which the common good is furthered by the self-interested behaviour of 
individuals in interaction, Friedrich Hayek develops a social theory of a 
“spontaneous order” (Hayek, 1967: 163) that can best occur when the state 
restricts itself to providing nothing more than the conditions necessary for 
a free market to function. A social system based on the autonomous and 
self-regulatory functioning of market forces would amount to, in the words 
of Hayek, “a society which does not depend for its functioning on our 
finding good men for running it” (Hayek, 1948: 11-12). The “spontaneous 
order” of a free society is thus not a product of the implementation of 
ideals, values, or principles; it is “the result of human action but not of 
human design” (Hayek, 1967: 96). Humans cannot be trusted to make the 
right decisions. For Hayek, it is better to rely on the market system than on 
human design, because of the fallibility of human knowledge. This 
epistemological modesty leads to the meta-ethical modesty of moral 
relativism, which Hayek explicitly endorses (Hayek, 1976: 25). 
However, not all right-libertarians would agree that their position 
involves the separation of politics from moral absolutes. Robert Nozick 
bases his libertarian political philosophy on what he regards as Kantian 
meta-ethical principles (Nozick, 1999: 30-33). Here the veneration of 
individual free choice in a free market society free from state interference 




of the common good, but because it is morally right in principle. The 
function of the minimal state is to uphold the liberty of each person, 
protecting them from coercive violations of their liberty, not to engage in 
such violations itself. An example Nozick gives of the state violating the 
liberty of the individual is the use of taxation to redistribute wealth 
through the funding of welfare programmes. The segment of the worker’s 
labour that creates the wealth that is taken away as tax is effectively forced 
labour (Nozick, 1999: 169-172). For Nozick, coercion of this kind is 
morally wrong, because it violates the Kantian principle that people must 
be treated as ends-in-themselves and not utilized as mere means to other 
ends. 
It may appear that the case of Nozick would seriously undermine any 
hypothesis regarding the morally relativistic nature of right-wing ideologies. 
However, Nozick’s position relies on a thoroughgoing restriction and 
distortion of the very Kantian principle that he himself invokes, such that 
it ceases to be recognizable as a meta-ethical principle at all. The principle 
in question is Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: “So
act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, 
in every case at the same time as an end, never as a means only” (Kant, 
2005: 88). Nozick interprets this to mean that each person is a “self-
owner”, not to be owned or used by anyone else. This entails that a person 
has the right to do what she wants and to dispose of her legitimately 
gained property as she wishes, free from external coercion, as long as her 
actions do not violate the self-ownership and property rights of others. 
Property is legitimately gained through “acquisition” of that which was 
previously not owned by others, by means of labour or discovery, or 
through voluntary “transfer”, by means of trade or gift-giving rituals such 
as inheritance (Nozick, 1999: 150-153). The status quo of the wealth 
distribution in a particular society is then ultimately legitimated by the 
categorical imperative as Nozick understands it, so long as that status quo 
results historically from legitimate property transactions. However, 
Nozick’s use of a form of the categorical imperative to legitimate a 
hierarchical socio-economic system containing huge wealth and opportunity 
gaps, gaps largely the product of privilege and inheritance, restricts its 
range of applicability to such an extent that it ceases to be a categorical 
imperative at all, and effectively becomes a hypothetical imperative. Of 
course, in Kantian terms a restricted hypothetical imperative is not a moral 
one. An example of such an imperative in this case could take the form of 
a conditional statement such as, “Do not treat a person as a means to an 
end unless they voluntarily present themselves as such under pressure of 
circumstance”. According to Nozick, when the state accrues tax revenue 
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from part of a person’s work it is effectively forcing the person to engage 
in unpaid labour and is thus treating that person as a means and not an end, 
but when an employer accrues surplus value from someone’s labour this 
employee is not having her self-ownership compromised simply because 
she, in a formal sense, voluntarily entered into the contract, even if she had 
no real choice due to her economic circumstances. Constraints that 
unjustifiably hamper a person’s liberty are only recognized by Nozick if 
they are narrowly legalistic, which is why he cannot recognize the way in 
which economic circumstances can seriously constrain a person’s 
autonomy, circumstances that are the product of a system which is created 
by people and which are thus morally relevant. Nozick’s attempt to derive 
a defense of libertarian capitalism from the moral absolute of the 
categorical imperative is ultimately untenable. 
Laissez-faire capitalism is sometimes defended in meritocratic terms 
and thus in universally principled terms of fair reward for people who 
deserve it. This is expressed most clearly in Ludwig von Mises phrase, 
“Under capitalism everybody is the architect of his own fortune” (Mises, 
1944: 100). In this ideology that states that the rich are rich because they 
are talented and hard-working and the poor are poor because they are 
feckless and lazy a universal egalitarian level playing field is assumed. 
The ideology is inconsistent, because the myth of an existent meritocracy 
is used to support the maintenance of a social hierarchy formed by 
inherited wealth. Any ideology that consistently aimed to create a 
substantive level playing field in the first place would be unlikely to be 
thought of as right-wing, even if that level playing field took the form of a 
market system. 
Pseudo-Universalism 
Right-wing political realism which separates moral absolutes from the 
political domain contrasts with the seeming idealism of the tendency on 
the right that has come to be known as neo-conservatism. The latter is 
generally associated with the belief in a strident assertion of the 
universality and superiority of Western political and economic values, 
largely in the area of foreign policy. While neo-conservatives claimed to 
support American military interventionism in places like Iraq on the 
grounds that it would promote democracy and universal human rights, the 
left saw it as imperialism, the expropriation of the wealth of another 
country to serve particular interests. 
Many political commentators and journalists have associated neo-




association is based largely on the fact that a number of neo-conservatives, 
including some who were involved in the Bush administration, were once 
taught by Strauss or by his students. However tenuous his connection to 
neo-conservatism is, it is certainly the case that Strauss was a highly 
influential conservative political philosopher. It is also the case that he 
criticized liberalism for encouraging what he called “relativism”, 
something that he thought led to nihilism. He uses the term ‘relativism’ in 
the normative sense, as he conflates it with the notion of tolerance 
(Strauss, 1965: 6). While he may be opposed to normative relativism, 
Strauss is himself a relativist at the meta-ethical level. He argues that 
morality comes from the arbitrariness of religious revelation rather than 
from rational deliberation, because being is fundamentally unintelligible 
and reason cannot ultimately justify itself (Strauss, 1965: 106-107). 
Despite attacking historicism for its relativistic encouragement of nihilism, 
he claims that “all natural right is changeable” (Strauss, 1965:157-159). 
In his essay entitled “Relativism”, he criticizes liberals such as Isaiah 
Berlin for what he considers to be their relativism, but the reason behind 
his criticism is that the liberals elevate tolerance to an absolute principle 
and that such tolerance stops people from believing in any principles 
(Strauss, 1989: 15). Later in the same essay the dismissive tone gives way 
to an approving one when Strauss discusses Nietzsche’s relativism. 
Nietzsche is party to “a truth that is deadly”, the relativity and lack of 
“objective validity of any principles of thought and action”, but, unlike 
that of the liberals, his philosophy is an attempt to circumvent the nihilism 
that this insight engenders (Strauss, 1989: 25). While in the “Relativism” 
essay Strauss makes reference to Nietzsche’s notion of a revaluation of all 
values which is a life-affirming creative act that avoids nihilism, in general 
what Strauss takes from Nietzsche is his elitism and exclusivism. In his 
book Natural Right and History Strauss suggests that the latter provides 
Nietzsche with an alternative means of averting nihilism to mere life-
affirmation. This alternative would be to write the relativistic “theoretical 
analysis of life” in an “esoteric” manner, such that only an exclusive elite 
would be exposed to the “deadly truth” (Strauss, 1965: 26). Strauss is 
really talking about himself rather than Nietzsche here and the ‘esoteric’ is 
a recurrent theme throughout his writings. The disjuncture between meta-
ethical relativism and normative absolutism takes the form of the 
distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric in Strauss’s work. For 
Strauss, writers who come to relativistic conclusions through philosophical 
reasoning should communicate these insights in an indirect and coded 
way, so that the “deadly truth” is only accessible to the elite few who are 
strong enough to deal with it. Such writers should, in the same texts, 
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communicate in an explicit exoteric way a different message for the 
mediocre masses, so that the masses can be protected from the nihilistic 
implications of the “deadly truth” of relativism. The message to be 
exoterically conveyed is that the norms and values of the society that 
people live in are absolute and unchanging. Strauss identifies this duplicity 
with Plato’s notion of the “noble lie” that is necessary for social cohesion. 
Strauss’s Nietzschean noble lie is a reversal of Plato’s, in that the Platonic 
lie involves hiding the truth of human equality and universality behind a 
racial myth in order to encourage people to accept the roles assigned to 
them in the ideal state, whereas the Straussian lie involves hiding the truth 
of relativity and contingency behind the myth of the universal applicability 
of a particular culture’s norms and values. 
Universalism in Denial 
As with Strauss’s critique of liberal tolerance, the contemporary right-
wing characterization of the left as being in thrall to a morally vacant 
relativism is based on the idea that the promotion of tolerance and 
diversity leads to a nihilistic non-commitment to any values. The left in 
question here is not the traditional left that aims to achieve socio-economic 
justice, but the “postmodern” left associated with so-called “identity 
politics” and multiculturalist pluralism. This tendency draws much of its 
inspiration from Michel Foucault, who argues that universal principles and 
the idea of a universal human nature should not be affirmative reference 
points for a genuinely emancipatory politics, because they inevitably bear 
within themselves particular structures of repression and exclusion. As 
universalism is considered to be only ever an imperialistic product of the 
culture that produced it, relativism is employed to enable emancipatory 
theory to avoid surreptitiously and unintentionally reproducing some of 
the subtle forms of domination embedded in the social formation it is 
submitting to critique. What we have here is a critical relativism enlisted 
to strengthen and deepen the critique of given power structures – a left-
relativism. 
This kind of relativism informs the “radical democratic” political 
theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who argue that the aim of 
politics should not be to achieve a universalist consensus, as this would 
always ultimately exclude and silence groups and individuals whose 
demands and needs were not even envisaged by any particular determinate 
emancipatory theory. In order to avoid this danger, antagonism and 
dissensus should be regarded as irreducible. The traditional left-wing 




and oppressed in terms of gender, race, and sexuality were ignored and 
marginalized. No political practice, whatever its intentions, can anticipate 
all the forms of exclusion and suppression that may arise, so a democratic 
space open to dissensus is always needed. For Laclau, there can be no 
definitive idea of the “good” that is not open to the “possibility of 
challenge” (Laclau, 1996: 100). 
However, this “postmodern” tendency is only identifiably left-wing 
because of its protest against given hierarchies and exclusionary 
discriminations. Its supposed relativism is really just a radicalization of 
emancipatory egalitarianism, one that promotes resistance to the repressive 
and exclusionary power structures that lie at the heart of the very 
constitution of identities. It appears to be relativistic, because it resists the 
homogenizing and imperialistic strictures of merely traditional values that 
are falsely presented as universally applicable. It is not relativistic, because 
its resistance involves an implicit appeal to freedom and equality as 
universal values. It is assumed that discriminations and repressions should 
be resisted on principle rather than accepted as constitutive and enabling 
features of social cohesion. Foucault at one point goes so far as to admit 
that his concern with “the undefined work of freedom” concurs with 
Kant’s notion of “enlightenment” as the maturity of self-determination and 
autonomy (Foucault, 2007: 110-114). 
Whether left-wing political philosophies think they are relativistic or 
not, they are all marked by a demand for both equality and a liberty that is 
predicated on there being equality. This is what Étienne Balibar calls 
“equaliberty [égaliberté]”, the idea that liberty as “non-coercion” and 
equality as “non-discrimination” are inseparable, such that “abolishing or 
fighting discrimination also implies abolishing or fighting constraint and 
coercion” (Balibar, 2002: 166). As an abstract ideal, equaliberty is 
affirmed categorically and unconditionally, as exceeding any determinate 
context. The inseparability of non-discrimination and non-coercion can be 
seen in the fact that Kant claims that the imperatives “to act on a principle 
one can willingly universalize” and “to treat people as ends-in-
themselves” are different ways of formulating what is essentially the same 
categorical imperative. 
Conclusion 
The characteristically left-wing affirmation of socio-political equality 
derives from moral universalism, the normative consistency required by 
the categorical imperative. The characteristically right-wing political 
affirmation of given hierarchies and of the interests of certain groups to the 
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exclusion of others can only be based on a form of moral relativism. The 
popular portrayal of the left-right dichotomy that reverses this schema is 
unfounded. The conservative idea that particular traditions are the only 
sources of normativity, the nationalist exclusion of certain groups from 
moral consideration, the moral arbitrariness of religious fundamentalism, 
and the market-libertarian requirement to rigorously separate politics from 
moral deliberation, all indicate that the family of right-wing ideologies are 
bound together by an implicit meta-ethical relativism. When certain 
segments of the left claim to follow a form of moral relativism they are 
mistakenly using the term to refer to an affirmation of universal equality 
and liberty against the imperialistic false universalization of the interests 
of particular dominant groups. 
It is sometimes said that the distinction between left and right has 
outlived its usefulness and that its persistence merely serves to obscure our 
understanding of the variety of political persuasions. If the distinction is 
framed in terms of the meta-ethical basis of either side it can be revealed 
that the intuitive and traditional placing of the variety of political 
standpoints on certain sides of the dividing line remains largely intact. 
This framing serves to clarify the meaning of the distinction in the face of 
the prevailing mutual and self mischaracterizations that the proponents of 
left and right frequently engage in. Essentially, what the terms left and 
right refer to is the meta-ethical orientation of political positions, with the 
range of left-wing positions characterized by moral universalism and the 
range of right-wing positions characterized by moral relativism. 
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